## DEPARTMENT OF STATE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SPORZEARY

4-14 Bail:

Pline see the secretary's possible comment at the right.

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## DEPARTMENT OF STATE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

lovember 29,

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MEMORANDUM TO: The Secretary

THROUGH.

FROM:


S/S WB P - Robert Manning PJM

There is a relatively simple and useful way to approach one of the principal problems discussed at this morning's EXCOM meeting with the President. The concern over continuel reports, rumors and speculation about continued cresence of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba will probably for some time elude full control, but the following steps would be of great value in easing the problem and perhaps even solve it.

- 1. Release to the press either directly or on back-ground (probably the latter) a full version of Mr. McConels oral presentation this morning of intelligence facts and as easments. There is not ing in it that is startling, nothing whose revelation fould jeopardize intelligence sources. Some care would have to be taken in the emphasia placed on the negative character of much of the assessment -that is, the point that we cannot absolutely prove that offensive missiles are not being secreted in Cuba. Otherwise the facts and assessments he presented today ought to be conveyed to the public. On its own, this report would not be sufficiently reassuring, out its value as reassurance sould be briefly enhanced by combin and release of this information with step (2).
- 2. Provide for the press a detailed despription of the system being used to check out refusee reports, to induce pre-checking by newsmen of supposedly valid records and to screen such information from refusees and others for their possible contribution to the intelligence picture. This should be done in a context which emphasizes the Lemiousness of unoheaked speculation in terms of their effect on public morale, on presibility of the Government and on fusure negociations. By so doing we sould probably develop a willingness of many of the would-be surveyons of such information to theor it out with the Government first.



3. A Third



3. A third step that would be helpful although it may not be altogether necessary, would be occasionally to publish recommaissance photographs to support the assessment referred to in point one. This would have the additional virtue of demonstrating that close surveilance continues and that any report with a shred of validity is being alertly followed up and examined by United States surveilance.

It is difficult to see any serious flaw in such a way of handling this particular problem. The sconer it is discussed, the more quickly we can begin to bring the situation under reasonable control.

## Recommendation:

That you present roughly this proposition to the EXCOM and urge early and concerted action to carry it out.

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